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Mechanisms of embodiment
Katinka Dijkstra* and Lysanne Post
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands
This paper is a critical review of recent studies demonstrating the mechanism of
sensorimotor simulation in different cognitive domains. Empirical studies that specify
conditions under which embodiment occurs in different domains will be discussed and
evaluated. Examples of relevant domains are language comprehension (Tucker and Ellis,
1998), autobiographical memory (Dijkstra et al., 2007), gestures (Alibali et al., 2014), facial
mimicry (Stel and Vonk, 2010), and problem solving (Wiemers et al., 2014). The focus
of the review is on supporting claims regarding sensorimotor simulation as well as on
factors that modulate dynamic relationships between sensorimotor components in action
and cognitive domains, such as expertise (Boschker et al., 2002). This discussion takes
place within the context of currently debated issues, specifically the need to specify the
underlying mechanisms of embodied representations (Zwaan, 2014; Körner et al., 2015).
Keywords: embodied cognition, sensorimotor simulation, memory, cognition, online embodiment, offline
embodiment
INTRODUCTION
More than two decades after the grounding problem in symbol theories was brought up (Harnad,
1990) embodied cognition approaches have gained a stronghold in the study of cognition
(Dijkstra and Zwaan, 2014). Since the first notion that cognition is grounded in perception and
action (Glenberg, 1997), an abundance of empirical studies have demonstrated support for this
groundedness (see for example Glenberg et al., 2013; Dijkstra and Zwaan, 2014).
Recently, the need to take stock of what all these studies contribute to the concept of grounded
and embodied cognition has been expressed (Willems and Francken, 2012). Moreover, discontent
with the current state of affairs has been noted. For example, opposing results in different studies
have been interpreted as supporting embodied cognition approaches, indicating that the predictions
may be too general to be falsified (Willems and Francken, 2012). Also, boundary issues have been
raised regardingwhat phenomena embodied cognition approachesmay ormay not be able to explain
(Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). For example, the issue whether, or to what extent, abstract symbols
are also grounded in action and perception is a recurring topic in the debate on embodied versus
disembodied approaches. Abstract concepts generally do not have physical or spatial referents, which
renders a direct mapping of an abstract concept with a sensorimotor domain problematic at least
(Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Dijkstra et al., 2014).
This criticism does not stand on its own but is complemented by constructive proposals to
counter the potential “erosion of the embodiment concept” (Willems and Francken, 2012) and to
get out of the “impasse” regarding the discussion around the grounding of language comprehension
(Zwaan, 2014). These proposals converge on the issue that the focus of current research should not
be on supporting either embodied or disembodied accounts but on how sensorimotor systems and
cognitive processes interact. The pluralist view of cognition proposed by Zwaan (2014) entails that
abstract and grounded symbols contribute differently to language comprehension depending on
how language is embedded in the environment in which it is used. In this view, research should
focus on what the representations consist of and assess when and how they interact (Zwaan, 2014).
Others proposals claim that research on embodiment lacks explanative power (Körner et al., 2015),
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should specify the conditions under which conditions certain
phenomena do or do not occur (Willems and Francken, 2012), and
integrate existing knowledge regarding embodiment to describe
its underlying mechanisms (Körner et al., 2015).
This review is written within the scope of these proposals
to more specifically assess conditions under which embodiment
occurs or not and to gain insight into underlying mechanisms of
embodiment. To accomplish this, studies are drawn from various
domains in research in which embodiment effects have been
found under clearly defined conditions and that demonstrate
the mechanism that underlies these embodiment effects. The
selection of studies discussed in this review is by no means
exhaustive but illustrates how a limited number of claims that are
empirically supported can contribute to a deeper understanding
of embodiment effects. “Embodiment” is defined here broadly as
the effect that the body or parts of the body (movement, position)
can have on cognition or vice versa.
MECHANISMS OF EMBODIMENT—
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION
Recent reviews on embodied cognition have focused on establish-
ing mechanisms of embodiment (Körner et al., 2015), describing
relevant domains in embodiment effects (Dijkstra and Zwaan,
2014), such as language comprehension (Fischer and Zwaan,
2008), or stipulating a theory on embodied simulation (Gallese,
2007, 2009), or grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008, 2010). A
common element in their reviews is that sensorimotor simulation
is considered to be a core element in cognitive processing.
Most recently, the idea of sensorimotor simulation as one of the
main mechanisms underlying embodiment, has been developed
further into specific ways in which this sensorimotor simulation
takes place (Körner et al., 2015). The first claim is that the
perception of a stimulus automatically triggers the simulation of
reenactment with it. Actions are facilitated when they match the
simulated actions and impeded when there is amismatch between
the two. Secondly, simulationmay be blocked by a concurrent task
that involves the same sensorimotor resources. The third claim is
that simulation may also work offline, whereas the fourth claim
entails that simulation depends on previous experiences and skills.
Two other claims are discussed later on in this review.
In this review, both the mechanism of sensorimotor simulation
as the claims derived from it are discussed in the context of
research domains that illustrate the conditions under which
embodiment occurred or failed to occur. Some of these domains
have already been studied extensively, such as language compre-
hension, whereas fewer studies have been dedicated to other
domains, such as autobiographical memory, gestures, expertise,
facial mimicry, and problem solving. The review will remedy this
omission by devoting more attention to these domains.
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION IN
LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
The idea of sensorimotor simulation is that there are neural
correlates between the content of what is being read and
represented (i.e., action words) and the areas in the brain being
activated (i.e., actions). Embodied cognition research on language
comprehension has focused on examining the simulations being
formed when reading sentences that are compatible with certain
actions that are performed (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Fischer
and Zwaan, 2008; Kaschak et al., 2014). In one study, participants
read sentences describing actions toward the body (John gave you
a pencil) or away from the body (I closed the drawer) and had to
make sensibility judgments regarding the content of the sentence
by moving their hand toward or away from their body by pressing
a button. Participants responded faster when the direction implied
in the sentence (i.e., toward the body) was congruent with their
own action (Glenberg andKaschak, 2002). This supports the claim
of congruence effects in sensorimotor simulation facilitating
performance for congruent over incongruent conditions.
Other studies have shown how simulation is prevented from
happening and how this affects cognitive processing. If the neural
system is already engaged with a task at the time that a similar
task requires a response and also involves the same neural
circuits, interference will occur and embodiment is impeded.
Consequently, there will be no facilitation of a congruent bodily
manipulation on cognitive processes. This has been demonstrated
in a study in which participants listened to sentences that implied
upward or downward motion and concurrently watched a display
on a screen that would scroll upward or downward (e.g., the cat
climbed the tree; Kaschak et at., 2005). Participants had longer
response times to decide whether the sentence made sense or
not when sentence content and visual display were congruent
than when they were incongruent. It was not possible to simulate
the motion they represented from the sentence as they were
processing the same motion in a different task. In the second
experiment (Kaschak et at., 2005), participants responded faster to
sentences when the visual stimulus concurrently showed motion
in the opposite direction as was implied by the sentence content.
Apparently, when neural circuits are already engaged for the
motion part of the experiment, it is not possible to simulate
sentence content that requires a mental representation of motion
information at the same time. Thus, interference occurred for
congruent but not for incongruent mappings.
The studies discussed above illustrate how and when the
simulation mechanism operates and when it does not. They also
support the claim that the perception of stimuli triggers their
simulation when theymatch and the claim that simulationmay be
blocked by a concurrent task that involves the same sensorimotor
resources. Compatibility effects are only present when neural
circuits are available for simulation of congruent stimulimaterials.
If not, interference for processing congruent stimuli materials
occurs. The third claim that simulation can work offline is also
supported by empirical research and is described in more detail
next.
Sensorimotor simulationmay happen offline (Niedenthal et al.,
2005; Körner et al., 2015) in the absence of a bodily state or action.
Research has shown that retrieving an object from memory,
and thinking or imagining an object generates responses in the
body that show similarities to the responses that would occur if
the object were present (Brouillet et al., 2010). Such an offline
embodiment effect was demonstrated in a study conducted by
Tucker and Ellis (1998). In this study, lists of words were presented
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to participants. Half the words represented small (penny) and
half the words represented large objects (beach ball) and these
words could be either natural or artificial. Participants indicated
whether the object was natural or artificial with a joy stick and
either had to apply a full grasp of the joystick or a precision
grasp between thumb and forefinger. The results indicated that
congruence in the grasp response with the type of object resulted
in faster responses (small object-precision grip) than when this
congruence was absent (large object-precision grip). Apparently,
participants have a similar response in the absence of the object as
when the object would have been actually present.
Another study demonstrating offline embodiment under
congruent conditions of sensorimotor simulation was a language
comprehension study (Pecher et al., 2009) in which participants
responded whether a picture of an object occurred in the sentence
preceding the picture. Previous studies have demonstrated that
participants tend to simulate the shape of the object, being slower
in the yes response of the object having occurred in the sentence
when the shape does not entirely match the implied shape of the
object in the sentence than when the object matches closely in
shape (Stanfield and Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan et al., 2002). These were
online effects. In the study by Pecher et al. (2009), however, the
matching or mismatching pictures were presented at the end of
the experiment when all sentences had been presented or after
a 45-min delay. In both retention conditions, a match effect was
found. Simulation of relevant aspects of the stimuli (shape) from
memory should have occurred because only this mechanism can
explain the faster responses under congruent (match) than under
incongruent (mismatch) conditions.
The studies discussed above demonstrate sensorimotor
simulation while processing the stimuli or considerable time
after these stimuli have been processed or reconstructed from
memory. Sensorimotor simulation affects the speed with which
responses are made and requires that relevant aspects of the
stimuli (for example shape or motion direction) are congruent
in order to transpire unless neural circuits are already activated
in a concurrent sensorimotor simulation and therefore blocking
the simulation from happening. These results illustrate what
favorable conditions are for sensorimotor simulation. Simulation
happens under favorable conditions, such as compatibility,
without the requirement that a bodily state or action is present at
the same time. Simulation is hindered, however, when the same
sensorimotor resources engaged in one task, are also needed for
a second, concurrent task, suggesting that simulation may be
a default mechanism that is constrained by how resources are
engaged. More compatibility effects have been demonstrated
in research on language comprehension (see for an overview
Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Kaschak et al., 2014) but it exceeds
the purpose of this review to mention them all. Importantly, we
aim to illustrate how certain claims regarding the sensorimotor
simulation also operate in different domains, such as gestures.
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION IN
GESTURES
According to the Gesture as Simulated Action (GSA) framework
(Hostetter and Alibali, 2008), gestures emerge when premotor
activation exceeds a certain threshold and spreads to motor
activation. This premotor activation is evoked by embodied
(sensorimotor) simulations, which occur, for instance, while
thinking about a task that would be facilitated by the use of
gestures, such as pointing. The motor activation that results from
exceeding the threshold is a gesture. This way, gestures express
embodied simulations.
Gestures do not only express embodied simulations, but
even have a causal role in the sense that gestures highlight
perceptual and motor information which are consequently more
likely to be incorporated in reasoning (Alibali et al., 2014).
Specifically, the information conveyed in gestures influences the
listeners’ reasoning, because they refer to present and absent
entities through pointing gestures and representational gestures,
respectively, which help the listener to comprehend what the
speaker is saying. Besides literally seeing what the speaker
means because of the pointing gestures, the referential gestures
can influence the readers simulations through activation of the
motor system, but they can also cause the listener to mimic
the speakers’ gestures which allows the gestures to influence the
listeners’ reasoning the same way they influenced the speaker.
This influence of gestures on simulations proposed in the GSA
framework is therefore in line with the idea of sensorimotor
simulation as a major mechanism underlying embodiment as
proposed by Körner et al. (2015).
Indeed, several studies suggest that perception of gestures
automatically triggers its simulation and that simulation may also
work offline. A study by Cook and Tanenhaus (2009), for example,
showed that speakers’ co-speech gestures while explaining a
problem solving task affected listeners’ behavior when solving the
problem on a computer (later in time, i.e., offline), that is, the
mouse trajectories resembled the observed gestures. There is even
evidence that speakers’ gestures activates listeners’ motor systems
(i.e., automatic simulation; Ping et al., 2014). This study also
showed that, in line with the claims made by Körner et al. (2015),
actions are facilitated when they match the simulated actions and
impeded when they mismatch. That is, the initially found positive
effect on reaction times for pictures after congruent sentences
from observing gestures disappeared when listeners moved their
arms and hands. In contrast, the effect did not disappear when
participantsmoved their legs and feet, indicating that the speakers’
gestures indeed activated the listeners’ motor system, that is, the
part of the motor system that is involved in gesture related body
parts, the arm and hands (Ping et al., 2014).
There seems to be, however, more to gesturing than
sensorimotor simulation. Pouw et al. (2014) focus on the
mechanism of offloading onto the environment, a claim on
embodiment stipulated by Wilson (2002). According to Pouw
et al.’s (2014) theory, gestures are external placeholders for
internal processes. This offloading on the environment allows
more internal processes to take place at the same time. Their
point is illustrated by the following two examples. First, gesturing
as if one actually rotates an object during a mental rotation task
(e.g., Chu and Kita, 2008) can reveal information that is otherwise
difficult to mentally compute and provide a physical platform to
support internal processes (Pouw et al., 2014). Secondly, pointing
gestures can aid internal cognitive processes by helping to keep
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track of counting (Delgado et al., 2011) or mental calculations
(Hatano et al., 1977; Hatano and Osawa, 1983). Thus, Pouw et al.
(2014) argue that gestures have a cognitive function, because
they are used for and support cognition when the costs of mental
computation are high (either by internal or external constraints).
Now, within the scope of the current paper, we ask what
can the interaction between gestures and memory tell us about
the underlying mechanisms of embodiment? Are gestures an
externalization of cognition (Pouw et al., 2014) or are the
relationships between gestures and cognition bidirectional, with
one influencing the other and vice versa (Alibali et al., 2014)? Even
though these two theories are not mutually exclusive, empirical
research has mainly shown support for the latter claim (Beilock
andGoldin-Meadow, 2010; Hostetter andAlibali, 2010; Post et al.,
2013).
Positive effects of gestures on children’s memory were found
in a substantial number of studies on mathematics (Broaders
et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2008), memory of a fictional story
(Stevanoni and Salmon, 2005), and word learning (Tellier, 2008;
see Macedonia and Von Kriegstein, 2012, for a review). Word
learning in a foreign language was also facilitated by gesture
observation for adults in a study by Kelly et al. (2009). These
results are in line with the current ideas about embodiment. In
the different studies, gesture production and observation seem
to reflect and even elicit sensorimotor simulations. Because it is
theorized that these simulations automatically emerge, gestures
should be an effective way to improve memory. Indeed, memory
was improved when participants used gestures (Kelly et al., 2009).
The studies discussed above demonstrated positive effects
of gestures on learning and memory. But there are also
circumstances under which gestures do not enhance learning
(Beilock and Goldin-Meadow, 2010; De Nooijer et al., 2013;
Post et al., 2013). Does that mean there is no embodiment
in those cases? Or do those studies perhaps even provide
evidence that embodiment is not characterized by sensorimotor
simulations? Not necessarily. Beilock and Goldin-Meadow (2010)
had participants gesture while explaining the Tower of Hanoi
task. Their gestures reflected disk size and weight, as they used
one-handed gestures when referring to the light disks and two-
handed gestures when referring to the heavy disks. In a second
task, weight was switched in a way that was less compatible
with the gestures that were made earlier (i.e., small disks were
heavier than large disks). Performance for participants in the
gesture condition declined, indicating that the gestures actually
represented theweight of the disks. Thus, in this case a detrimental
effect of gestures is actually revealing sensorimotor simulations
(i.e., embodiment).
Other studies in which negative effects of gestures were
found shed light on the boundary conditions of sensorimotor
simulation. For example, Post et al. (2013) found that, for children
with poor general language skills, gestures increase cognitive
load and hamper learning when imitated online during the first
encounter with new material. For these children, sensorimotor
simulation, and thus embodiment, was prevented by the cognitive
overload they experienced. De Nooijer et al. (2013) found that
gestures do help when imitated during either learning or testing,
but not when imitated during both. It is not entirely clear what
caused the effects found by the Nooijer et al., but it is clear that
gestures are not always beneficial for memory.
There is also empirical evidence of the influence of cognition on
gestures. Gesture frequency during descriptions of images of dot
patterns was influenced by participants’ physical experience with
the patterns (Hostetter and Alibali, 2010). Participants gestured
more when they had specific physical experience with the patterns
than when they had only learned visually. The experiments show
that this was not due to a decrease in verbal rehearsal or motor
priming. Hostetter and Alibali conclude that gestures occur when
people talk about thoughts that involve action simulations.
In sum, within the domain of gestures, the interaction of action
and cognition is bidirectional. Gestures are a form of actions that
can influence learning and memory and this is interpreted as
support for embodied cognitive processes (Hostetter and Alibali,
2008; Pouw et al., 2014). In line with the claims made by Körner
et al. (2015), the described gesture studies support the idea that
perception can automatically trigger sensorimotor simulations,
that actions can be facilitated or hampered depending on
congruency with the simulated actions, and that simulations also
work offline. However, there are boundaries as to how far this
embodiment of gestures reaches, because gestures are not always
supportive for learning, for example when cognitive resources are
overloaded (Post et al., 2013).
The domain of gestures is after language comprehension
the second cognitive domain that illustrates how sensorimotor
simulation operates, under which conditions, and what the
boundaries are. Another domain in which relevant aspects
of the body can influence memory through simulation is
autobiographical memory.
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION IN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
A simulation view of autobiographical memory entails that
modality-specific states of perception, action, and introspection
that were activated when an event was experienced, are activated
again when the experience is represented at a later point in
time (Niedenthal et al., 2005, 2014; Dijkstra et al., 2007; Dijkstra
and Zwaan, 2014). If autobiographical memory is a simulation
and reconstruction of the original experience along with the
relevant perceptual, sensorimotor and affective components of
the experience, facilitation of the retrieval process should occur
if these components of the original experience are triggered when
the retrieval process is initiated (Dijkstra and Zwaan, 2014).
Support for this prediction was found in a study in which
participants retrieved autobiographical memories in body-
congruent and body-incongruent positions relative to that of
the original experience (Dijkstra et al., 2007). Participants were
not only faster retrieving the memory when prompted after
assuming a body-congruent position (talking about a previous
visit to the dentist while being reclined in a chair) than in a
body-incongruent position (talking about this dentist visit while
standing up with the legs out and the hands in the waist) but also
retained the memory better after a period of 2 weeks when they
were asked to talk about the memories they retrieved 2 weeks
earlier. This study demonstrates sensorimotor simulation under
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congruent conditions of body position both during retrieval
and long-term retention tasks. It seems as if body position is a
sensorimotor component of the original experience that acts as
an embodied cue to facilitate the reconstruction of the original
experience. The ease of retrieval is reflected in faster retrieval
times to access a relevant (i.e., body congruent) memory and even
strengthens the memory trace so that body-congruent memories
are remembered better at a later point in time.
This study supports two of the claims that were discussed
earlier, compatibility effects when there is a correspondence
between the stimuli condition (body position) and its simulation
(the body position that was relevant during the original
experience). The other claim is that the study demonstrates
offline embodiment because experiences from the past are
being reconstructed rather than experiences that happen at
this moment. The study also supports the claim regarding
embodiment by Wilson (2002) that offline cognition is
body based, specifically for memories that are records of
spatiotemporally localized events that are relived by the person
who remembers them. Studies demonstrating congruence effects
with a body manipulation thus provide strong support for claims
regarding sensorimotor simulation.
Do these simulations extend to more indirect relationships
between bodily states and autobiographical memory simulations?
For example, the mapping of certain actions, such as moving
hands “up” or “down” with certain emotions, such as “positive”
for “up” and “negative” for “down” illustrate such an indirect
relationship. This mapping is an example of a conceptual
metaphor, abstract concepts that have metaphorical associations
with actual experiences (Dijkstra et al., 2014). Conceptual
metaphors arise from a pattern of associations of concrete
experiences (cheering, jumping out of joy) with certain body
movements (upward movement). Conceptual metaphors, such as
“positive is up” can be understood in terms of concrete concepts
and experiences, such as the times that you cheered when your
favorite soccer team scored a goal, or the times you slumped in
your seat when the other team scored against your team. Based on
the conceptual metaphor that maps verticality with valence, the
prediction can be made that the retrieval of positive or negative
autobiographical memories should be facilitated when an up or
down action is performed, but only under movement-valence
congruent conditions (up and positive, down and negative).
This facilitation was demonstrated in a study involving body
movement and emotional memory retrieval (Casasanto and
Dijkstra, 2010). Participants retrieved autobiographical memories
to prompts while moving both hands upward to deposit a marble
in each hand in two containers that were placed in a higher
location, or downward into containers below. The idea behind the
study was that an upward movement triggers the “up is positive”
metaphor and facilitates retrieval of positive memories, while
a steady downward movement triggers the “down is negative”
metaphor and facilitates retrieval of negative memories. The to-
be-retrievedmemories, were either positive or negative (Tell me of
a time you felt proud of yourself/Tell me of a time you felt ashamed
of yourself) in Experiment 1, and neutral (Tell me of an event that
happened yesterday) in Experiment 2. In Experiment 1, reaction
times to congruent (positive is up) and incongruent (positive is
down) movement/valence memories were assessed. Participants
were faster retrieving memories in congruent than incongruent
trials. In the second experiment, participants again moved their
hands but first retrieved memories to neutral prompts silently
and then retold the memories afterward when their hands did not
move. They were more likely to retell memories they later judged
as positive when they moved their hands upward.
Just as in the previous study with body position (Dijkstra et al.,
2007), body movement seemed to facilitate access to the memory
itself by activating a relevant aspect of the experience, the emotion
that was experienced at that time. This was an indirect trigger,
however, because the emotion arose as a result of the mapping of
a motor action and the associated emotion with that action. Both
studies demonstrate the role of offline sensorimotor simulation
under congruent conditions. The last study also supports the
claim by Körner et al. (2015) that simulation may play a causal
role in processing emotion. Only the activation of the mapping
between valence (“positive is up”) and the vertical movement of
the hands (up) explains why participants have better access to
emotion-movement congruent memories and attribute a certain
emotion to memories when they move their hands a certain way.
A similar embodiment effect demonstrating the mapping
of body position with valence was demonstrated in a study
by Riskind (1983). Participants were instructed to be either
in an upright position and smile or in a slumped position
with a downcast expression and their head and neck down.
While being in this position, they had to retrieve unpleasant
and pleasant experiences. The results indicated that participants
were faster in retrieval of these experiences in body position-
valence congruent condition (upright and pleasant or slumped
and unpleasant) compared to body position-valence incongruent
conditions. Again, research demonstrated that manipulations of
the body affect cognitive processes under specific conditions:
those of body-valence congruence.
A last study that contributes to our insight into sensorimotor
simulation in autobiographical memory does not involve the
retrieval of emotional experiences but the generation of emotion
words, such as “disappointment” and “pride” that are associated
with previous emotional experiences in which the word was
relevant (Oosterwijk et al., 2009). Given the association of
positive words with up movements and negative words with
down movements, changes in body posture (straight up or
slumped) were expected depending on the emotion that was
elicited. Participants’ height wasmeasured (with a hidden camera)
during the word generation procedure which would give an
indication of the posture demonstrating pride (upright posture)
or disappointment (slumped posture). The results showed that
participants indeed changed their body position to a lower, more
slumped position when disappointment words compared to the
body position during the generation of pride words (Oosterwijk
et al., 2009).
Other than the previous study, this study illustrates a more
subtle embodiment effect. Body position was influenced by the
simulated sensation that was triggered by the valence of the
presented words. A major difference with the autobiographical
memory studies, discussed above, is that the effect of
perceiving a valenced stimulus triggered the simulation of
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the valence-matching body position, not the other way around
as in the previous studies. Such bidirectional effects were also
demonstrated in the discussion of research on gestures. A
similarity with the autobiographical memory studies on valence
was that all three studies illustrate the claim that simulation
plays a causal role in processing emotion. A stimulus or action
that is congruent in valence with the simulated stimulus or
action can be simulated more readily and easily than when
these favorable conditions are absent. Autobiographical memory
retrieval and sensorimotor processes tap into long-term memory
stores of experiences that are being simulated when triggered
appropriately. In other domains, the accumulation of motor
experiences builds up to a certain level of motor fluency and a
knowledge base that can be tapped into when being triggered.
Individuals, who have done this over a long period of time, can
tap into this store more easily and efficiently than those who have
not. They are considered to be experts.
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION:
EXPERTISE
What happens when a person has performed complex motor
movements and motor sequences so many times that a high
level of expertise has been reached? From an embodied cognition
perspective, if someone has extensive experience with in an action
domain, such as tennis, more grounded representations will be
activated when playing or talking about the sport compared
with a novice. This fits with the claim by Körner et al. (2015)
that automatic simulation depends on previous experiences
and skills. Experts are likely to form a full-blown first person
mental simulation of the described actions (with many grounded
representations) whereas a domain-novice would form shallow,
word-like representations instead (Sutton and Williamson, 2014).
Themotor expertise that has been developed would then facilitate
any processing and memory of expertise-related information that
is presented to this expert. Several studies have demonstrated
support for this assumption.
In one study, expert climbers were tested to see if they would
remember climbing routes of wall elements better compared
to novices (Boschker et al., 2002). Expert climbers have built
up motor fluency of specific climbing movements and should
therefore remember these routes better. In addition, they should
notice elements of the climbing environment as potential holds
for grasping and establishing a route for ascend or descend to a
greater extent than novices. The results supported the assumption
that experts remembered the climbing routes with the affordances
that the wall elements offered whereas the more inexperienced
climbers tended to focus on structural features of the climbingwall
and did not remember the routes as well. Expertise thus facilitates
the way to take in and remember expertise-related information
that results in superior performance on cognitive tasks. Here, the
sensorimotor system involves an accumulation of experiences that
feed into the cognitive domain.
There is another relevant aspect of expertise when considered
from an embodied cognition perspective, which may actually
hinder performance on certain tasks, and this is loss of attentional
control. Expert skills are built up over a substantial period of time,
resulting in competencies that are part of procedural knowledge
and no longer require explicit attentional control (Beilock et al.,
2004). Consequently, if actions have to be performed with
unlimited time available, novice learners in a domain should
benefit from this whereas it may actually harm an expert because
control processes may come into play for a task that only requires
procedural skills (Beilock et al., 2004).
These effects of expertise were demonstrated when experts
imagined actions that were within their expert motor repertoire
(Beilock and Gonso, 2008). Novice golfers had lower accuracy
scores in putting when speed was stressed in the instruction
and they had to actually make a putt, or imagine putting a
certain sequences of actions. In contrast, expert golfers performed
better on actual and imagined putting when time was more
limited because they tapped into their proceduralized skill under
conditions of time pressure but allowed conscious control when
more time was available which impaired their performance.
Imagery appeared to serve the function of action readiness in these
experts. This is similar to the step-by-step unfolding of the action
itself and involves the same cognitive and motor parameters.
When speed is no issue, other elements become important in the
imagery process of experts that involve explicit control of the skill,
which gets in the way of the planning of actual steps.
Motor expertise may therefore enhance memory performance
and performance accuracy because complex patterns are practiced
frequently and readily available. However, superior memory
performance in experts tends to be limited to expertise-
related information relative to everyday information and novices
when stimuli were encoded through observation, or enactment
(Dijkstra et al., 2008). The knowledge and experience base are
specific to the domain of expertise and do not necessarily transfer
to other domains.
Because the action patterns that form the basis of expert
performance are overlearned, motor expertise may also lead to
reconstruction bias (Barsalou, 1999) in tasks that may cause some
confusion as to whether an item tapping into this fluency was
encountered before or not. As a result, it may be more difficult
to differentiate between patterns that were or were not presented
or imagined previously. This false recognition bias was examined
by (Yang et al., 2009) who assessed the effect of the expert skill
of typing on recognition rates of letter dyads that would normally
be typed with the same finger (j and h with the index finger) or
with different fingers (j and l), reflecting motor fluency among
expert typists. The idea was that the activation of action plans
that are associated with the different letter dyads, such as dyads
reflecting higher motor fluency could lead to decision errors
on a recognition task among experts but not novices. Experts
have more consistent mappings between certain letters and how
they type them. The results supported this assumption. Skilled
typists recognized different-finger letter dyads that were not
presented earlier incorrectly as having been presented beforemore
frequently than novices. Recognition memory was influenced by
the covert simulation of repeated action patterns among experts.
As a typist, you cannot help but covertly simulate themotor action
of typing letters when you are merely processing them visually.
Therefore, you think you saw letter dyads before because you have
a covert motor trace of activating these letters. In other words,
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your motor fluency gets in the way of simply performing the
cognitive task.
These studies on the role of expertise show how sensorimotor
simulation operates in the domain of expertise. The activation
of previous experiences relevant for an expert task results in
the availability of relevant knowledge for a particular task. This
knowledge can be utilized in the performance of motor and
memory tasks. If other information is allowed to enter the system
when there is ample time available or if processing information in
one modality allows for covert simulation of action patterns that
are part of motor fluency, expertise can actually get in the way of
performance in the cognitive domain. What we learn from these
studies is that there are different aspects of expertise that play a
differential role in the interaction between sensorimotor systems
and cognitive domains. These have to be taken into account when
examining the role of expertise from an embodied cognition
perspective.
The studies discussed so far were chosen because their
results support claims regarding sensorimotor simulations.
Language comprehension is facilitated under congruent
stimulus-simulation conditions and hindered when the neutral
circuits needed for simulation are already engaged with
another task. Gestures can be considered as a way to offload
information into the environment reducing working memory
load and increase availability of cognitive resources for internal
cognitive processes. Bodily cues, such as body position, help
the reconstruction process of the original experience when
retrieving an autobiographical memory. Expertise intensifies the
interactions between action and cognitive domains. Repeated
action patterns allow experts to take in and remember more
relevant aspects of a scene than novices (Boschker et al., 2002)
because they have learned to perceive their environment in a
different manner. All these effects operate through sensorimotor
simulation under congruent conditions and both online and
offline. However, once motor fluency has been developed
in experts, it cannot be undone easily which suggests that
performance may include activated yet incorrect information
from a motor repertoire, forming a bias in memory processes.
In the preceding sections, research on offline embodiment
effects was discussed in the domains of language comprehension,
gestures, autobiographical memory, and expertise. Simulation
may occur in the absence of an object, in a later stage of stimuli
processing, when retrieving an event from the past, and as an
accumulation of previous experiences. Another domain in which
offline embodiment effects can be explained with sensorimotor
simulation, is problem solving.
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION:
PROBLEM-SOLVING
Embodied research on problem-solving often demonstrates the
use of physical or imagined simulation to facilitate finding the
solution for a task. Awell-known example in this respect is a study
by (Kirsh and Maglio, 1994) in which participants have to rotate
and flip falling block shapes quickly to make them fit with the
surface and the blocks they fall on. Participants use the strategy
of actual rotation of the blocks in order to determine the best fit
rather than mental computation to solve the problem. This fits
with the idea of sensorimotor simulation and the facilitating role
of the body in the simulation process (Dixon et al., 2014).
An example of such simulation is a study that employed a gear-
system problem. Participants have to predict the turning direction
of the final gear in a series based on the turning direction of
the gear that drives the force to the system. Participants typically
solve this problem by employing their body, that is, by manually
simulating themovement with their hand of each gear that follows
the previous one (Dixon et al., 2014). This manual simulation
then helps participants to discover the higher order solution that
applies to all these problems which is the insight that alternation
occurs of the gear direction.
Simulation based on indirect but commonly occurring
mappings between abstract concepts and concrete experiences,
as we saw in the studies in the autobiographical memory domain
has also been demonstrated in the domain of problem solving.
Apart from the “positive is up,” mapping, other mappings exist,
for example in relation to the mental number line, “many is up”
or “few is left.” They can also be activated with sensorimotor
manipulations and facilitate processing of information if the
mapping is present. Numerical magnitude can be represented
both horizontally, with left representing a smaller quantity
than right (Pinhas and Fischer, 2008), and vertically, with up
representing a larger quantity than down (Shaki and Fischer,
2012). We stack coins into piles with higher piles indicating
higher quantities and numbers are usually written horizontally
with lower numbers being presented on the left and higher
numbers being presented on the right.
Wiemers et al. (2014) examined the activation of these two
representations, horizontal and vertical, in a mental arithmetic
task. Participants performed addition and subtraction tasks
while making upward and downward movements, movements
to the right and left, or no movement at all with their right
arm in Experiment 1. They solved more problems under
movement/magnitude congruent than incongruent conditions. In
Experiment 2, they did the same arithmetic task but this time the
arithmetic problem (and not their arm) moved in the directions
described above. Again a compatibility effect of movement with
the spatial representation of the task (up and addition with down
and subtraction) was shown. This study demonstrates the idea
of sensorimotor simulation through compatibility of actual and
perceived movement in order to solve the task. Moreover, earlier
experiences with arithmetic and the representation of magnitude
were activated when the magnitude-spatial mapping occurred
which resulted in facilitation of the response.
Werner andRaab (2014) also investigated themapping between
horizontal spatial representations and the abstract concept of
magnitude but in a different type of problem solving task. The
authors used the water-jar problem which requires participants
to obtain a required volume of water when they are given certain
empty jars for measure. Participants were primed to a left or right
gaze direction in a perception task to mentally compare full jars
either to the left or the right of a similar empty jar. This should
bias them to either the left or right when being presented with
the water jug problem and after they sorted marbles from outer
bowls inward (plus group) or the otherway around (minus group).
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Participants indeed demonstrated a spatial bias in gaze direction
to the right for the plus group and to the left for the minus group
without there being differences in overall problem solving ability.
A similar gaze design was used by (Thomas and Lleras, 2007)
who manipulated gaze behavior in participants prior to them
being exposed to a problem solving task, known as the Duncker
radiation task. Participants have to destroy a tumor in a patient on
a computer screen with lasers while keeping the tissue around the
tumor healthy. The solution to this task is to have multiple laser
beams fire at low intensity at the tumor from various locations
around the tumor so that the convergence of these beams can
destroy the tumor, yet keep the tissue intact. Participants whose
gaze behavior was manipulated to make saccadic eye movements
between the tumor and the surrounding locations, which hints at
the solution, were more successful in solving the problem later
than participants who were instructed to fixate their gaze on the
tumor. Here, the practiced eye movements (moving in and out
versus fixed) facilitated later problem solving by activating the
sensorimotor simulation to tackle the problem.
A last study demonstrating sensorimotor simulation in a
problem solving task involved spatial working memory (Thomas,
2013). Again, the underlying assumption was that movement with
arms or eyes may embody the solution to an insight problem
through simulation. A second assumption was, however, that
actions will only affect problem solving when the representations
of these actions are active in working memory. If these
representations are (no longer) active, no effect will occur.
Participants tried to solve the Duncker radiation problem, but
different from the study discussed above, participants had to
occasionally perform a visual tracking task. Moreover, they held
a spatial (a grid filled with dots) or verbal stimulus (a string
of digits) active in working memory at the same time. It was
expected that holding a spatial stimulus in memory would engage
spatial working memory resources and therefore interfere with
the problem solving task, even if the eye movements are directed
at various locations around the tumor. The results showed that
being assigned to an embodied-solution condition (observing
different colored stimuli from different locations around the
tumor toward the tumor and out again) indeed was not sufficient
for better problem solving performance. Only if they also held
a verbal stimulus active in working memory did they solve the
Duncker problem after fewer attempt intervals. They also did
this faster than participants who were in the same embodied-
solution condition but also held a spatial stimulus active. In
other words, representations in spatial working memory affected
problem solving even if participants were visually primed toward
a solution of the problem. This demonstrates the simulation
blocking effect that we encountered in the discussion of language
comprehension research. If neural circuits are already engaged
with a concurrent task, simulation is impeded or blocked.
The studies discussed from the domain of problem solving
also support the claims regarding sensorimotor simulation. Under
specific conditions of congruence as long as neural circuits are
not engaged beyond capacity, sensorimotor simulation may aid
problem solving. This simulation may be a physical or mental
simulation and can take place during the task or afterward. It may
also apply to the last domain to be discussed in this review, facial
mimicry. Research conducted within this domain also supports
the last claim fromKörner et al. (2015) that has not been discussed
as of yet, and that is the claim that simulation is important in social
interactions.
SENSORIMOTOR SIMULATION: FACIAL
MIMICRY
Facial mimicry is the imitation of facial expressions by a person
who is observing these expressions in another person. This
commonly happens when emotions are expressed on the face
(smile or frown), usually in a situation in which someone is
communicating with someone else but also when observing
pictures or videos of other persons who display an emotion
on their face. The mimicry of these emotions on the face is
the simulation of what one observes. How does this happen?
When individuals observe actions and emotions of others, the
same neural circuits are engaged as when the same actions
and emotions would be experienced personally (Oosterwijk
and Barrett, 2014). We therefore understand the feelings and
emotions of another person through the engagement of neural
circuits based from a recreation of these feelings in ourselves
(Niedenthal et al., 2005). From an embodiment perspective, this
is an interesting notion because it illustrates how embodiment
is a shared rather than an individual phenomenon and it fits
with a sensorimotor simulation account that presupposes a causal
role regarding emotion processing and is important in social
interactions (Körner et al., 2015).
Researchers on facial mimicry agree that emotions are
grounded in online bodily states that arise from a context-specific
experience in which the emotion is evoked and distributed across
multiple regions of the brain (Niedenthal et al., 2014). Facial
mimicry then is the way how the sharing of emotion becomes
apparent for the other (Niedenthal et al., 2014). Facial mimicry
can help to strengthen social bonds between people because a
speaker receives through the facial expression of the listener the
feedback that the other understands what is being communicated.
If the expression is emotional, facial mimicry may signal the
other is feeling the same way. This benefit of understanding
the other may not be limited to understanding how the other
person is feeling but extend to understanding what this person is
communicating.
Empirical support for these assumptions comes from research
manipulating how an emotion can be expressed on the face
(Niedenthal et al., 2001; Oberman et al., 2007; Stel and Vonk,
2010). An emotional expression on the face can either be induced
by placing a pen between the teeth, or blocked by placing a pen
between the lips to block the expression of smiling. In one study
employing the emotion-blocking procedure, some participants
held a pen in the mouth between the lips to hinder the expression
of smiling whereas other participants could display their emotions
freely. When instructed to detect changes in facial emotion
expression in morphed pictures (from sad to happy) participants
were slower to recognize the emotion change when their ability
to display the emotion was blocked than participants who did not
have this restriction (Niedenthal et al., 2001). In another emotion-
blocking study, participants placing pressure on a pen, showed an
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impaired ability to recognize happy faces relative to participants
who could show facial expressions without being hindered in their
expression and thus engaging the relevant muscles (Oberman
et al., 2007). Both studies demonstrated better performance on
a cognitive task when participants were able to freely express
their emotions on the face relative to a condition in which the
expression was blocked. Other than the studies discussed above in
which simulation was impeded because of engagement of neural
circuits with a concurrent task, here simulation is physically
blocked by limiting the muscles to contract to express emotion.
These effects of manipulations of the face can also be the result
of more invasive procedures, for example when getting the first
Botox injection. People have these injections to eliminate wrinkles
from their forehead for a certain period of time. A by-effect is
that at the peak of the effectiveness of the injection, the corrugator
muscle that normally is involved in frowning does not participate
in the frowning after Botox is injected. This non-participation
of the muscle was used in a study in which participants read
sentences with angry, sad, and positive content right before and
3 weeks after the Botox injection when the effectiveness of the
injection reaches a peak (Havas et al., 2010). The results indicated
that reading times were slower after the injection than before but
only for the sentences with negative content. Because participants
were no longer able to frown due to the paralysis of the muscles in
the corresponding area, facial feedback of expressing the emotion
to emotion-relevant neural circuits was disrupted and processing
of negative sentences affected because the associated frowning
expression could not be made.
The studies discussed so far on facial expression and mimicry
illustrate how sensorimotor simulation occurs and under what
conditions this may or may not happen. This effect is specific to
the emotion that can be displayed on the face and the emotion
that is depicted in or activated with the stimuli materials. The
effects discussed so far were online effects where the observation
and display of emotions occurred while processing emotional
expressions on a face, or valenced information in sentences. A
few studies have also examined offline effects of facial expression,
supporting the claim that simulation may work offline when
the bodily state no longer is relevant for a cognitive task to be
performed.
Specifically, studies have assessed the effects of manipulations
by having participants remember or retrieve emotional
information after the task was completed (Schnall and Laird,
2003; Halberstadt et al., 2009). A study by Halberstadt et al.
(2009) included pictures of ambiguous facial expressions that
were paired with an emotion concept, such as “happy,” or with
a concept unrelated to emotion, such as “reliable.” Afterward,
faces encoded with the happy concepts were remembered as
happier than in the learning phase whereas no such effect was
demonstrated for the concepts that were unrelated to emotion
(Halberstadt et al., 2009). The encoding process thus was relevant
for later memory when the pictures of the faces and the labels
of the concepts were no longer available for comparison. In
another study, participants practiced facial expressions and body
postures based on emotional cues (Schnall and Laird, 2003).
After this practice phase, participants responsive to personal
cues recalled more life events that were emotionally congruent
(positive memories to an upright body posture and smiling facial
expression) than incongruent with the practiced expressions.
Both studies demonstrated offline simulation because once
an emotion-congruent association of facial or bodily expression
with emotion concepts was established, memory for encoded or
newly retrievedmaterials was higher under congruent than under
incongruent conditions. These studies on facial mimicry also
underscore the causal role in emotion processing. An emotional
stimulus is needed in order for the simulation to occur or be
blocked. Otherwise, simulation of the emotional expression on
the face would be irrelevant. Moreover, if the emotion cannot
be simulated on the face because of a physical (pen) or mental
(suppression) prevention of emotion to be shown, the benefits
as a result of the compatibility effects disappear. Finally, the
simulation mechanism may work offline, after a bodily state has
occurred. This was shown in the studies demonstrating benefits
of facial mimicry in memory tasks in which earlier encoded
information under simulated conditions had to be retrieved at
a later point in time when the manipulation of the body was no
longer relevant.
Facial mimicry was the last domain that demonstrated
sensorimotor simulation, in particular its effect on emotion
processing and within a social context. Together, these six
domains, language comprehension, gestures, autobiographical
memory, expertise, problem solving, and facial mimicry, support
an account of sensorimotor simulation to explain embodiment
effects in specific ways. Now, it is time to take stock of what this
empirical support in those domains has brought us. How stable
and general is sensorimotor simulation?
CONCLUSION
Some researchers claim that the degree of simulation required
for a task is inversely related to the abstraction needed for it
(Myachykov et al., 2014). In this view, the more abstract the
process, the more offline it is, and themore stable it is. In contrast,
online processes are less stable because of their sensitivity to
individual differences in the sensorimotor experience. Although
this may be a promising notion that could be developed further,
our review shows rather how universal sensorimotor simulation
is, as much for abstract and offline processes as for concrete and
online processes, by accounting for a wide variety of embodiment
effects in various domains. It remains to be seen whether online
processes are less stable than offline processes and how sensitive
online processes are to individual differences in the sensorimotor
experience. Based on the discussion of the studies on online
processes in this review, there is no evidence that online processes
are less stable than offline processes.
Interference of embodiment was demonstrated in research on
language comprehension, gestures, and problem solving. This
phenomenon occurs when the same neural circuits are engaged
for the sensorimotor as the cognitive processes in an experiment.
At this point, it is not entirely clear exactly how the interference
occurs and whether it is strictly a capacity problem or a dual
engagement problem. It appears that involvement in one task
leaves insufficient resources for the other and that this interferes
with simulation. This was also found in some of the gesture
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studies that demonstrated negative effects of gestures among
children with poor general language skills (Post et al., 2013). For
this group, gestures increased cognitive load and had a negative
effect on performance. Further examination of these conditions
is essential to a deeper understanding of how sensorimotor
simulation operates.
As said before, this overview of research on sensorimotor
simulation in various domains is by no means exhaustive.
Examples from different domains were chosen to illustrate
this mechanism and specific claims operating under this
mechanism. This review can be considered a first step
toward an approach that further defines conditions under
which embodiment occurs or not, and how they depend on
previous experiences and skills, affect emotion processing,
and operate in social situations. The evidence so far points in
the direction of congruence/compatibility being a necessary
condition for embodiment to occur and for engagement of
similar systems to hinder embodiment. Only in this context
can offline simulation and emotion processing be accomplished.
The role of simulation in social interactions requires further
study. Only support from one domain was discussed in this
review.
Future research should also start to address questions regarding
individuals who may be less able or susceptible to the effects of
the body. How does sensorimotor simulation work for individuals
with depression, aphasia or dementia? Would children be more
or less affected by manipulations of the body, or does it not
make a difference? For example, children with poor language
skills may not benefit as much from body manipulations, such
as gestures, compared to children with average to good language
skills (Post et al., 2013). Likewise, older adults may not benefit as
much from embodied encoding compared to young adults when
theirmemories that are being retrieved, aremore remote (Dijkstra
et al., 2007). On the other hand, in the posture study (Dijkstra
et al., 2007), older adults demonstrated as much facilitation from
congruent postures as younger adults.
With these studies, domains, and claims, we have now a
better understanding of one of the major mechanisms underlying
embodiment; sensorimotor simulation. The future holds promise
for further exploration and specification of the claims associated
with this mechanism and gathering empirical evidence to support
these claims.
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